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done in class "B", "C", or "D" zones. When attempts have been made
to banish churches to the business districts, it has been held that:
"to require that churches be banished to the business district,
crowded alongside filling stations and grocery stores, it is clearly
not to be justified on the score of promoting the general
welfare."32
This writer believes that the majority opinion, because it was
decided contrary to the well considered and unanimous authority of
other jurisdictions, is supported by insufficient persuasive argument,
and could do great harm to private education, should be overruled
by the Wisconsin Court at the earliest opportunity. If allowed to
stand, it can mean a limitation of the right of parents to educate their
children as their conscience directs, a right long ago established by the
United States Supreme Court.3 3 If the schools are forced into the
business and industrial areas, or outside the city limits, these schools
become less accessible and desireable. The state is then an active party
to unwarranted limitation upon the right of all parents to educate
their young as they see fit. The Wisconsin Supreme Court should
have seriously pondered the clear language of the United States
34
Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters:
"The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in the Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature
of the state. Those who nurtured him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."
CLAUDE- KoRvis
Torts-Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Carrier-Passenger
Cases-Action by plaintiff for injuries allegedly received while a
passenger in defendant's taxicab, plaintiff claiming she was thrown
or bounced against the inside roof of the cab. The cab driver, the
only other witness, testified that there was no bump, swerving, marked
change of speed or other occurrence which could account for the
alleged injuries. The jury found that plaintiff was injured while a
passenger, but that the cab driver was not negligent. Trial court
granted a motion for new trial "in the interests of justice," holding
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied and that answers to
negligence questions were contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
32 State ex rel Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in America v. Joseph,
139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942).
3 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, (1923) ; Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925).

34 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, ibid.
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Held: Reversed. Assuming, but not determining, that res ipsa applies,
the trial judge erred concerning its effect. The court abused its
discretion when it gave the rule greater probative force than the jury
did. Justice Currie, dissenting, agreed in principle with the majority's
statement regarding the effect of the doctrine, and affirmatively
held the case a proper one for application of res ipsa loquitur. He felt,
however, that the discretion vested in the trial judge was sufficiently
broad to authorize the order under review. Mayer v. Boynton Cab
Co., 66 N.W. 2d 137 (Wis. 1954).
The positive statement by Justice Currie that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applies in this case, and the assumption by the
majority that it might apply, are of some significance in view of
previous cases finding the doctrine inapplicable to auto accident cases.
A recent law review article1 on the question summarizes the author's
findings by quoting Linden v. Miller:'
"As a rule, in auto collision the direct cause of the accident
and the controlling circumstances attendant thereon are usually
not so within the control of a driver as to raise a presumption
of negligence on his part. In other words, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur does not usually apply to such accidents."
The principal case is distinguished from the ordinary auto negligence case because of the existence of the carrier-passenger relationship. Such a relationship imposes on defendant carrier
"the highest degree of care reasonably to be expected from
human vigilance and foresight in view of the character of the
conveyance adopted and consistent with the practical operation
of the business." 3
It is not inconsistent, therefore, to hold res ipsa inapplicable in the
ordinary auto negligence case while applying the doctrine in passengercarrier cases, since an inference of slight negligence might be legitimate
where an inference of ordinary negligence is not.
The carrier, initially saddled with so high a standard of care, has
understandably complained against imposition of further impediments
upon its attempted defense. Perhaps the chief defensive weapon left
in the carrier's hands is the passenger's usual ignorance of the facts
which produced the accident. He knows that he was a passenger,
and he knows that he was injured; but he is often totally unaware
of what series of events produced his injury. Unless afforded a
further measure of judicial assistance, therefore, he may be unsuccessful in proving that slight degree of carrier-negligence upon which
his recovery depends. Such was the result in the principal case;
135 MARQ. L. REv. 36 (1951-52).

2172 Wis. 20, 177 N.W. 909 (1920).
3 158 Wis. 69, 147 N.W. 3 (1914).
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and such was the result even more unfortunately, in a recent Michigan
decision,4 where plaintiff passenger failed to recover because of the
jury's inability to decide which of two colliding vehicles was negligent,
although it was certain that one of the two was guilty.
The courts are unanimous in holding that a common carrier, while
an insurer of goods 5 is not an insurer of its passengers 6 in the absence
of statute or express agreement to that effect. The distinction is based
on the fact that a passenger, unlike an owner of goods who delivers
them to the carrier, can exercise care and vigilance in the interests
of his own safety. 7 A carrier obviously should not be held liable for
injuries suffered by a passenger due to the passenger's own negligence.
It is perhaps upon this basis that justice Currie's willingness to apply
res ipsa in the present case is most obviously open to criticism.
Once applied, the rule is well settled in Wisconsin and in the
majority of jurisdictions 9 that the procedural effect of res ipsa is
to permit the jury to draw an inference (as distinguished from a
presumption) of negligence, there being no compulsion to find for
the plaintiff even in the absence of rebutting testimony; nor does
the rule have the effect of shifting the burden of proof, which
remains with the plaintiff.' 0
Assuming that, as a policy matter, it is advisable to lend a measure
of legal assistance to a passenger seeking to recover for injuries
sustained while in that protected status, there is some question as to
whether application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is the most
desirable method of doing so.
The Louisiana courts have chosen another method. The defendant
carrier, in cases where he has superior means of knowledge as to
the cause of the accident, has the burden of proving "that it was
free of any negligence which had a causal connection with the
accident.""' A study of Louisiana cases reveals that prior to the case
of Ensminger v. New Orleans" no requirement of "superior knowledge" on the carrier's part was imposed, the carrier having the burden
of proving itself free from negligence by a preponderance of the
4Rogers v. City of Detroit, 340 Mich. 291, 65 N.W.2d 848 (1954).
v. Wis. Power and Light Co., 194

59 AM. Jup., Carriers,§660, pp. 813-814.
6 10 C. J., Carriers,§1312 p. 863; Ormond

Wis. 305, 216 N.W. 489 (1927).
710 Am.JTu., Carriers,§1236 p. 155.
8 Ryan

v. Zweck Wollenberg Co., 267 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954). Koehler

v. Thiensville State Bank, 245 Wis. 281, 14 N.W.2d 15 (1944).
9 167 A.L.R. 665.
10 10 AM. JuR., Carriers,§1629, p. 373; 10 C. J., Carriers,§1426(b), p. 1023-1028.

11 Schmitt v. Algiers Public Service Co.. 69 So.2d 754 (1954). Plaintiff's decedent
was fatally injured in a fire destroying defendant operator's waiting room.
Plaintiff was nonsuited in the lower court. Held: Affirmed. The burden of

exculpating itself was placed on the carrier but on a showing of due care,
on its part, defendant carrier successfully met that burden and plaintiff's
cause of action falls for lack of proof of specific acts of negligence.
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evidence in any case. 13 The primary reason relied on was that of
contractual relationship:
"***carrier*** due to its contractual obligation for safe carriage, coupled with the fact of injury caused by an instrumentality under its control, [has] cast upon it the duty of exonerating itself from negligence."1 4
The early cases have been distinguished1 5 and explained 6 but not
overruled.
At first blush, it would seem that the Louisiana rule goes considerably farther in assisting the injured passenger than would a
liberalized application of res ipsa to the situation. The advantage thus
apparently gained, however, disappears upon closer inspection of the
most recent case in that state. For the rule there appears to be
that, once the carrier has established prima facie that it exercised
care in the premises, the passenger must either present evidence to
the contrary or face a nonsuit. The quantum of proof ordinarily
required to establish due care on the part of the carrier does not
appear by any means to be large. The passenger's relief from the
necessity of proving matters of which he is ignorant is, therefore,
only temporary, so shortlived, indeed, as not even to carry plaintiff
to the jury room.
Res ipsa loquitur, on the other hand, if it were held to apply in
at least some passenger-carrier cases, would in most situations have
sufficient vitality to live past a motion for nonsuit, and would normally
support a verdict favorable to plaintiff if one were returned, regardless of the quantum of proof.adduced by the carrier that it exercised
due care.
It is undoubtedly true, as the majority in the principal case appears
to suspect, that an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
the ordinary passenger-carrier case involves a decided liberalization
of the traditional requirements for utilizing the doctrine.
In his noted work on Torts, Professor Prosser states the requirements:
"The conditions usually stated as necessary for the application
of the principle of res ipsa loquitur are three: (1) The accident
must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence; (2) It must be caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
12 Ensminger v.
3.3 Hart v. Gulf,

New Orleans, 65 So.2d 402 (1953).
M. & N. R. Co., 167 So. 166 (1936). LeBlanc v. Sweet, 107 La.
335, 31 So. 766 (1902).
Hart v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., supra note 13.
15 Ensminger v. New Orleans, supra note 7, distinguishing early cases.
16 Cusimano v. New Orleans, 170 La. 95, 127 So. 376 (1930).
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defendant; (3) It must not have been due to any
117 voluntary
action of contribution on the part of the plaintiff."
The difficulty of proof arises chiefly with respect to the first
element. The passenger in the ordinary case, being ignorant of the
chain of circumstances producing the injury, is at an obvious disadvantage in attempting to prove that such circumstances exclude
any reasonable explanation of the unusual occurrence other than the
carrier's negligence. Yet, if the passenger is prohibited from invoking
the doctrine until he has excluded non-negligent explanations, a strict
reading of the traditional rule of res ipsa would almost invariably
forbid the use of the doctrine in the average passenger-carrier situation. In its strict traditional sense, res ipsa relieves a plaintiff from
showing specifically that defendant's negligence caused the injury,
but substitutes an obligation of proving that nothing else caused it.
It is indeed the rare case wherein a plaintiff may draw any great
solace from the substitution; and by the same token, it is indeed the
rare case in which the doctrine, under strict application of its traditional requirements, may be invoked at all.
One thing, however, may be stated as obvious: if a strict adherence
to traditional prerequisites of res ipsa is continued, then certainly the
inference permitted when the doctrine is invoked successfully should
be raised to the full dignity of a presumption. The doctrine is practically valueless when it first requires plaintiff to exclude, by proof
of circumstances, all reasonable explanations of the injury other
than defendant's negligent conduct, yet rules that a mere permissible
inference is the most that can result.
The writer's conclusion, therefore, is that some liberalization of
the traditional requirements of res ipsa loquitur is necessary before
the dictum of Justice Currie in the principal case can be freely
accepted, and res ipsa applied in any but the most isolated passengercarrier cases. At the same time, it would appear that the passenger's
problem of proof would be eased to a greater extent by such liberalization than by the Louisiana rule shifting the burden of proof to
the carrier.
RALPH

E.

ANFANG

Income Taxation-Deductibility of Advertising ExpendituresTaxpayer corporation, engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing and installing laboratory equipment, printed and distributed
catalogs to its representatives to be used as reference books in making
sales of equipment. In the years of 1944, 1945, and 1946 the taxpayer
incurred costs as a result of printing a new catalog which was pub1 PRossER, TORTS,

§43, p. 295 (1941).

